DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 19, 1999

TO: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director

K. Fortenberry, Deputy Technical Director

FROM: D. F. Owen, D. J. Grover, RFETS Site Representatives

SUBJECT: RFETS Activity Report for the Week Ending November 19, 1999

Dave Grover was out of the office Tuesday through Thursday and Don Owen was out of the office on Monday and Tuesday this week.

Adherence to Safety Controls/Conduct of Operations. As reported in last week's site rep report, DOE-RFFO and RFETS contractor management have noted a trend of increasing problems with adherence to authorization basis (AB) safety controls and with conduct of operations in general during the last few months. Kaiser-Hill has directed a slowdown of operations for facilities under Safe Sites of Colorado (SSOC) and Rocky Mountain Remediation Services (RMRS) to address problems with adherence to safety controls and proper conduct of operations. Focused training of personnel and reviews of operations have been in progress and will be completed over the next few weeks. Long-term actions are also being developed.

DOE-RFFO emphasized to Kaiser-Hill that inadequate floor-level technical vigilance in safety matters by supervision and management is a major cause of the problems. DOE-RFFO noted that long-term actions need to be identified by Kaiser-Hill that improve technical vigilance during operations by Kaiser-Hill, SSOC and RMRS supervisors and managers. (1-C)

Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (PuSPS). The DOE-STD-3013 package inner containers procured by Kaiser-Hill from a US vendor have failed the welding acceptance tests. The containers were fabricated to the same requirements as the BNFL-provided containers, which passed the welding tests. Post-test evaluations of the containers identified differences between the BNFL containers and BNFL provided drawings. Efforts to revise the drawings to incorporate the as-built condition of the BNFL container are underway. To avoid any PuSPS startup delay, 100 containers are being procured from the BNFL supplier. (3-A)

Building 707 BIO Implementation. This week Kaiser-Hill completed an Independent Validation Review (IVR) to confirm adequate implementation of the Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) controls and credited safety programs. The new BIO was intended to consolidate analyses and controls from a range of prior documents into one central document. As a result, there has been only minor changes to floor implementation for most controls, but more emphasis placed on credited safety management programs and personnel level of knowledge of the controls and programs. The IVR team (and the DOE-RFFO oversight team) identified only a limited number of minor deficiencies and concluded that Building 707 had generally done a satisfactory job in implementing the BIO controls. It appears Building 707 took the lessons learned from recent IVRs at other facilities seriously in preparing for this IVR. (3-A)

cc: Board Members